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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional theories of adjudication are curiously incomplete. Their fo-
cus is on the process by which a single judge decides or ought to decide
cases. Judging is treated as though it were a solitary act, occasioning ref-
erence to other judges only to the extent that the artifacts of their past
efforts provide authoritative or instructive precedent for the present deci-
sions of the lone judge. The real world of adjudication, though, differs
dramatically. Only at the trial level do judges normally decide cases alone.
Intermediate courts of appeal and courts of last resort are organized so
that judges almost always sit and act together with colleagues on adjudica-
tory panels. And the size of these panels almost always varies directly
with the level of authority they enjoy within their legal system, indicating
our widely-shared, naive belief that this multiplicity of judges is in some
sense a route to "better" decisions.1 Appellate adjudication, the common,
almost exclusive focus of theories of adjudication, is thus essentially a
group process, yet extant theories neither explain the group nature of the
process nor take it into account.2
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I. Some version of this belief inspired Congress earlier in this century to create three-judge federal
district courts-now largely abandoned-to adjudicate cases of particular sensitivity, most notably
those involving injunctive disruption of state laws. See 23 U.S.C. § 2281, Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, 62 Stat. 968, repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119. This statute was originally enacted
in a narrower form as Judicial Code § 266, Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (three-
judge court required for interlocutory injunction against enforcement of state law). The reach of
three-judge panels was expanded by 28 U.S.C. § 380, Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 938
(three-judge court required for permanent injunction against enforcement of state law) prior to its
repeal.
2. Considerations of practical politics dominate discussions of the group aspect of judicial decision-
making. The Supreme Court is the typical object of such discussions, which are usually concerned
with the pragmatic aspects of the melding of the views of the nine justices into patterns of results.
Broader theories of the group dynamic of Supreme Court decisionmaking may invoke notions of polit-
ical stability or representation. But such theories make no effort to tie these concerns to the basic
jurisprudential question of how judges do and ought to decide the cases before them.
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In this Article, we offer some observations about the attributes of multi-
judge courts and their relationship to basic themes in the theory of adjudi-
cation. While this first venture falls short of a comprehensive theory, it
involves considerably more than minor tinkering with conventional under-
standings of adjudication. Our effort to incorporate the fact of group deci-
sionmaking into analysis of the judging process has led us to generate a
fundamental distinction between "preference aggregation" and "judgment
aggregation" in processes of group decisionmaking, to reconsider the tradi-
tional taxonomy of schools of jurisprudence in terms of this distinction, to
reflect on the idea of representation, and to refine and distinguish the con-
cepts of "consistency" and "coherence" as they apply to judicial
decisionmaking.
From the midst of these analytical turnings, three propositions emerge
with some force. First, given a reasonable understanding of what the job
of judging is and under reasonable assumptions about how well individual
judges are likely to do it, enlarging the number of judges who sit on a
court can be expected to improve the court's performance. Second, multi-
judge courts are quite capable of behaving consistently. If each judge on a
court acts consistently from case to case, so too will the court that they
constitute. Third, the same simple relationship between individual and
group judicial performance does not hold for coherence. The coherence of
a body of law generated by a court depends not only on the ability and
commitment of each of its constituent judges to behave coherently, but also
upon the nature and congruence of these judges' understandings of the
criteria for coherence.
We of course hope to leave the reader persuaded that ours is a useful
analytical lens through which to view the group aspect of the adjudicatory
process, and to secure confirmation of our sightings through that lens.
But, more importantly, we hope to convince the reader that the fact of
group decisionmaking demands the attention of any serious and complete
theory of adjudication.
II. THREE MODELS OF GROUP DECISIONMAKING
Groups can adopt a wide variety of mechanisms for generating deci-
sions on questions of concern to them. The criteria of decision can vary
enormously, from chance, to collective preference, to deific will, to moral,
aesthetic, scientific, or legal judgment. The designated arbiter of decision
can vary, from king or priest, to general electorate, to professional com-
munity, to legislature, court, or jury. So, too, the decisionmaking process
of the designated arbiter can vary, from oracular ritual to a variety of
deliberative and voting procedures. All of these mechanisms of choice in-
volve decisions made on behalf of groups. Most of them also involve deci-
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sions made by groups, in the sense that the actual decisionmaking process
involves and responds to expressions of choice by more than a single indi-
vidual. Group decisionmaking in this second, active sense is our concern
here.
Our understanding and evaluation of any group decisionmaking pro-
cess, like appellate adjudication, depends necessarily upon the purposes
and capacities that we impute to that process. These can vary in signifi-
cant, often ignored, respects. Thus, discussions of group decisionmaking
shift uneasily and often unconsciously among at least three distinct models
of group processes, which we will label preference aggregation, judgment
aggregation, and representation.'
A. Preference Aggregation and Judgment Aggregation
The most significant analytic divide separates preference aggregation
from judgment aggregation. It originates in the difference between ex-
pressing a preference and rendering a judgment."
3. In Section III, infra, we discuss in detail the relationship between preference and judgment
aggregation and traditional jurisprudential positions. Here, we offer the eager reader some sense of
the connection between our analysis and traditional jurisprudence.
Most jurisprudential theories of adjudication consider adjudication, at least implicitly, to be the
rendering of a judgment rather than the expression of a judicial preference. While Ronald Dworkin's
theory may represent the purest example of a judgment-based theory of adjudication, (consider, for
example, his argument in "Hard Cases" and "Can Rights be Controversial?," both in R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130, 279-90 (1977)), legal positivism also considers the making of
judgments central to adjudication. H.L.A. Hart introduces his game of "scorer's discretion" precisely
to emphasize that judicial decisions do not reflect the whim, will or preference of the judge, but rather
the judge's considered judgment of what the law requires. In scorer's discretion, the game's scorer is
not bound by fixed rules, but is free to specify the score at her discretion. In contrast, Hart analogizes
judicial decisionmaking to a game in which the score is determined under a fixed rule. H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961).
Some strands of realism and inquiries influenced by economics and political science often regard
adjudication as an expression of judicial preference. Jerome Frank's account represents the most non-
judgmental, realist theory of adjudication. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1970). Some
critical legal theorists may view themselves as heirs to this aspect of the realist tradition; one might for
instance interpret the practice of "trashing" as an attempt to establish that decisions that are indeter-
minate as judgments rest on preference instead. For a discussion of critical legal studies and the
indeterminacy thesis, see Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Kelman,
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984). Both Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook regard judges as
acting on preferences. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 506 (3d ed. 1986) ("One [possi-
ble explanation for judicial behavior] that is consistent with the normal assumptions of economic
analysis is that judges seek to impose their personal preferences and values on society."); Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 815 (1982) ("Each group of Justices. . . has
a preference between the two positions taken by the others."). For more extended comments on Eas-
terbrook, see infra notes 27, 35, 37.
The view of appellate courts as representative bodies may be most common among journalists and
the lay public. This view, however, does emerge in the legal literature. See, e.g., Hazard, The Su-
preme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1978).
4. Sen introduces a distinction between the aggregation of individual interests and individual
judgments. Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Reexamination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977), reprinted in
A. SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 158 (1982). Sen apparently considers the difference
between interests and judgments to lie in the nature of the information relied upon in making a
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1. Preferences and Judgments
When an individual expresses a preference, she is advancing a limited
and sovereign claim. The claim is limited in the sense that it speaks only
to her own values and advantage. The claim is sovereign in the sense that
she is the final and authoritative arbiter of her preferences. The limited
and sovereign attributes of a preference combine to make it perfectly pos-
sible for two individuals to disagree strongly in their preferences without
either of them being wrong. Nor does the presence of disagreement pro-
vide a reason for either person to change her preference. Thus, the claim
"X prefers meat" neither conflicts with the claim "Y prefers fish" nor
provides a reason for Y to alter or even reconsider her preference.5
In contrast, when an individual renders a judgment, she is advancing a
claim that is neither limited nor sovereign. The claim is not limited in the
sense that claims of preference are; a judgment advances a "truth," that is,
a proposition to which all other right-thinking persons who may confront
the issue must adhere. The claim is decidedly not sovereign in the sense
that an individual's adherence to the judgment does not itself justify it.
Two persons may disagree in their judgments, but when they do, each
acknowledges that (at least) one of them is wrong. Moreover, the disa-
greement should give each pause: that others evaluate the circumstances
differently may be a reason to revise or reconsider one's judgment. The
claim "Meat is the healthier food" conflicts with the claim "Fish is the
healthier food"; if X and Y have these incompatible convictions, then the
position of each is a reason for the other to reconsider.'
At the core of the distinction between expressing a preference and ren-
dering a judgment lies the proposition that some questions have "right" or
"correct" answers. In this context, a "right" or "correct" answer need not
be objectively true or depend upon some ultimate view of the real world; it
decision.
5. While disagreement is not a reason for one to change one's preference, it may provoke a change
nonetheless. For instance, X might prefer meat to fish because her preferences for food derive from
more basic preferences over taste, nutritional content, and appearance of the food. If X were mis-
informed about the nutritional content of meat and fish, disagreement might lead her to discover that
the nutritional content and health effects of meat were sufficiently less desirable than those of fish so
that her expressed preference would change. Her underlying preferences, however, would remain
constant. Other cases are more complex. X might prefer agreement with Y to disagreement. The
disagreement provides X with new information about the situation and again her expressed preference
might change. The disagreement here is a cause of the change, but not a reason for it.
6. Knowledge that one person is wrong does not imply that either person will alter her judgment.
Judgment lies within rational discourse, however, and seeks a correct answer. Knowledge that another
party has reached a different answer gives one reason to review one's own judgment. This reason is
most easily understood in a situation in which no dispute over the criteria of truth exists. If X
"judges" that 121 x 11 = 1321, while Y "judges" that 121 x 11 = 1331, both have reason to check
their calculations. Of course, Y might choose not to check her calculation because she knows X is a
bad calculator or because she must make an immediate decision or because the calculation need only
be accurate to within ten percent.
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may depend only upon intersubjective agreement over criteria for resolv-
ing disputes.7 When we render a judgment, we assert that the question of
the moment has a right or correct answer in some significant and general
sense and that our answer to the question embodies that rectitude. In con-
trast, when we express a preference, we assert only that we value or de-
sire a particular thing or outcome over some alternative. In many social
contexts, of course, the appropriate judgment as to a social course of ac-
tion may depend upon the preferences of individuals who constitute the
social entity, but this observation uses rather than attacks the distinction
between judgments and preferences.
This distinction and its ramifications may seem too sharply drawn, and
we want to anticipate some potential reservations. One objection that sug-
gests itself is that preferences are simply a common subspecies of judg-
ment, distinguished only by their personal subject matter. This claim is
inspired by the possibility that a person can be wrong about her prefer-
ences. If we take preferences to be comprised solely of the immediate,
accessible feelings of desire experienced by an individual, she can never be
wrong about their content. But what of claims that, for example, neurosis,
ideology, brainwashing, or a simple lack of careful reflection have dis-
torted an individual's observation of her true sense of value? These claims,
which are familiar and in appropriate contexts persuasive, hold that the
"true" preferences of an individual may not be reflected in her superficial
experience of transient wants.' But if we can be wrong about our prefer-
ences, in what sense are we the final arbiters of our preferences, and how,
if at all, do expressions of our preferences differ from judgments about
other truths in the world?
The claim that a person is in error about her preferences can only
mean that there is something distorting them, and that once it is banished,
her authentic sense of self will assert itself, allowing her to recognize the
true objects of her desire.' Her authentic underlying self remains the ulti-
mate authority as to her true preferences. She cannot be wrong about her
preferences in the same way that she can err on the question of whether
or not her ankle is broken. A preference is not a condition that happens to
be lodged in a particular person, about which thinking persons can
disagree.
7. Again, Hart's example of the game of scorer's discretion makes this point quite dramatically.
See supra note 3. For purposes of this argument, then, we need not take a position on various com-
plex issues of skepticism and the relativism of ethics and "truth" itself.
8. Much of the argument of Habermas and the Frankfurt School, for example, rests on the claim
that people do not act on their true interests. For a lucid and illuminating discussion of true or real
interests, see R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 45-54 (1981).
9. Again, Geuss explicates these ideas more clearly than the school which has advanced them. See
id.
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In short, the claim that preferences are simply judgments about certain
personal matters is not persuasive. A more or less parallel claim, however,
pushes in just the opposite direction: that normative "judgments" are, at
their roots, matters of preference.10 On this view, at some point in all
normative discourse reason ceases to drive the argument-assuming that it
ever did-and recourse must be made to presuppositions of value. These
root presuppositions, it could be argued, share the distinguishing quality
that we have assigned to preferences: they are the product of the non-
rational, sovereign choice of those persons who adopt them.
This view of normative discourse is decidedly odd. Suppose that X
holds the view that every human life is intrinsically, deeply, and equally
valuable, and Y holds the view that no one need value any life other than
her own. It might be true that reason would fail either as a means of
convincing the other. But each would hold that the other was wrong, very
wrong, and would deny that the other was entitled to his or her view of
the matter. When we advance claims of this sort we assert normative pro-
positions binding on others and recognizable by all right-thinking persons.
We do not assert the state of our own emotional impulses.
Still, the value-preference view of normative discourse is surprisingly
common, and it is not necessary that we assume the burden of van-
quishing it simply to explore the perplexities of multi-judge courts. Sup-
pose we assume that there is a place in normative conversation at which it
is appropriate for a claimant in effect to say "I have presupposed this
value, and my commitment to it is nonrational, beyond debate, and wholly
within my prerogatives; were you to adopt a contrary presupposition, it
wouldn't be wrong, merely different." Or suppose we assume, more spe-
cifically, that, in the realm of legal adjudication, normative presupposi-
tions of value of this sort ultimately drive the arguments and decisions of
judges. To be sure, such presuppositions are properly understood to be
preferences. But it hardly follows that the preference/judgment distinction
collapses or loses its value. Even at its most extreme, this skeptical stance
is best explained in terms of and depends upon the preference/judgment
dichotomy and is not an attack on the dichotomy at all. If some or all
normative discourse is understood to rest upon a foundation of presup-
posed, arbitrary values, it remains the case that such root normative pref-
erences can support large structures of contingent truths of the form
"Given my presupposition A, it follows that B." Such contingent truths, of
course, are matters of judgment, despite their preference-based predicates,
because they claim the assent of all right-thinking persons, persons who
share criteria for evaluating the truth of such contingent claims.
10. J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS 15-49 (1977), advances a careful argument for this position.
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2. Group Aggregation of Preferences and Judgments
When we assign to groups the task of making certain social choices, the
distinction between preference expression and judgment rendition re-
mains. Consider a parent of three children who has promised them a
night's treat. The two available options are going to the movies or playing
miniature golf, and the parent puts the choice to the children for discus-
sion and vote because he believes that the choice of entertainment should
"reflect the preferences of the children." This group decisionmaking pro-
cess is preference-based in two respects. First, what each child is being
asked to express is his or her preference between the entertainment alter-
natives. Second, the collected preferences are valued intrinsically, that is,
precisely because they are held by the children, and not because they are a
means to an extrinsic truth. This is a paradigm of preference aggregation.
In contrast, consider the organizers of a horseracing event, who have
designated a panel of three stewards to decide controversies that may arise
during a race. The stewards are asked to rule on an objection by one
jockey that another jockey improperly cut her off. Here, the group deci-
sionmaking process is judgment-based. Each steward is being asked to
render her judgment on questions like "Did Jockey A improperly cut off
Jockey B?" The organizers value these collected judgments extrinsically,
that is, not merely as a reflection of each steward's view, but as a means
of determining a truth extrinsic to the stewards themselves. This is a par-
adigm of judgment aggregation."1
The distinction between preference aggregation and judgment aggrega-
tion sharpens our focus on the question of multi-judge courts. Group
decisionmaking obviously commends itself in the classic democratic con-
text: if we are in the business of structuring governance decisions for a
particular group, and think it appropriate to make the preferences of the
members of the group decisive over the decisions in question, then it
makes perfect sense to set up a group decisionmaking process like a town
meeting or a simple voting procedure. But adjudication does not fit this
simple and appealing model.
Suppose first that we try to explain adjudication as an exercise in pref-
erence aggregation. What plausible theory makes the preferences of the
handful of men and women who serve as judges attractive as the determi-
nants of social policy? Set against and dwarfed by this very basic problem
11. Some readers will correctly observe that a utilitarian values the preferences of individuals
intrinsically, but as a means to an extrinsic truth, namely, the choice of the morally correct course of
action. For our purposes, there is nothing particularly confounding about this view. Utilitarianism is
simply one reason for preference aggregation. Although it involves the pursuit of an extrinsic truth, it
introduces that truth at a different and later stage of analysis, and makes that truth dependent on the
intrinsic preferences of individuals.
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is the question most pertinent to our inquiry, which is whether and why
we ought to be more at ease with a system in which the preferences of
three or even nine judges determine questions of importance to large seg-
ments of the society.
It will probably come as no surprise to the reader that we in fact
strongly lean toward a view of adjudication as an exercise in judgment
aggregation;12 indeed, we understand most plausible schools of jurispru-
dence to embrace this view. But characterizing adjudication as judgment
aggregation merely deepens the problem of multi-judge courts. If we care
about the preferences of the members of a particular group, then canvass-
ing that group makes good sense. But, if we seek to discover an extrinsic
truth, then consultation of many rather than one is not obviously desir-
able. If you want the correct answer to the question "Do the children
prefer to go to the movies or to play miniature golf?," assembling the
moppets and asking them is an obvious way of getting it. But if you want
the correct answer to the question "Did Jockey A improperly cut off
Jockey B?," why get the judgments of three stewards? In what respects, if
any, are three stewards' heads better than one? Would nine be still better
than three? If legal adjudication is understood as an exercise in judgment
aggregation, and what we want from courts are correct answers as in
horse racing, these questions have an obvious-and obviously problem-
atic-bearing on the operational virtues of multi-member courts.
Before we explain our sympathy for the view that adjudication is an
exercise in judgment aggregation, and before we tussle with the question
of whether adding Homers reduces nods, we want to complete our analy-
sis by introducing a third, overlapping model of group decisionmaking:
representation.
B. Representation
The distinguishing quality of representation is that one group (the ac-
tive group) is expected to reach a result that emulates the result that
would be reached by another group (the reference group) if the latter
undertook to decide the matter. Typically, the active group is a small sub-
set of the reference group.
Consider the producers of a costly film, who are anxious to choose be-
tween two endings, and arrange a series of screenings as a means of gaug-
ing the preferences of their national audience. The audiences in these
small screenings are expected to register preferences, and the results are
valued solely as a reflection of the preference distribution of the much
12. We offer some justification of this judgment below. See infra Section III.
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larger audience to which the film will eventually play. This is a paradigm
of representation.
Instances of representation can be categorized by the type of decision
that is being reflected and by the process of reflection. The information
desired about the reference group might implicate preference aggregation,
where the question concerns the distribution of preferences in the refer-
ence group among possible outcomes. Or it might implicate judgment ag-
gregation, where the question concerns the prevailing judgment within the
reference group as to which of the possible outcomes is correct.
In either case, the means of getting the desired information from the
active group can assume two quite distinct forms, and the questions put to
the individual members of the active group will diverge accordingly. The
question to the individual might assume the form: "What is your prefer-
ence (or judgment) between state of affairs A and state of affairs B?" In
this case, the active group will be treated as a surrogate for the reference
group, with the hope that the resulting preference or judgment informa-
tion will fairly approximate the pattern of preferences or judgments held
by the reference group. Alternatively, the individual question to the repre-
sentative group might assume the form: "What do you think is the distri-
bution of preferences (or judgments) in the reference group between state
of affairs X and state of affairs Y?" If so, the members of the active group
will be expected to render judgments as to the pattern of preferences or
judgments in the reference group.
Representation cases in which the active group is treated as a surrogate
for the reference group, with members of the active group voting their
own preferences or judgments, introduce a novel element in the modeling
of group decisionmaking processes. Such cases pose the special question of
the quality of the the active group's surrogacy, the "fit" of its results with
those which would be arrived at by the reference group. 3 In contrast, in
those cases in which the members of the active group are expected to
render judgments about the anticipated response of the reference group,
the active group is called upon to behave like any other judgment aggrega-
tion group.
13. The Supreme Court is often popularly regarded as a representative institution. See supra note
3. Consider Roman Hruska's remark, on Carswell's nomination to the Supreme Court, that mediocre
people are entitled to representation too. The representative model, however, has wider application.
One might consider the panels of three chosen to decide a case as representing the entire bane of
judges on a circuit. One of the statutory provisions concerning the composition of panels is consistent
with this representative view. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982) requires that the majority of the judges of
each panel "be judges of that court." This provision increases the likelihood that the panel decision
will "fit" the en banc one. We are grateful to our colleague Richard Revesz for pointing us to this
example and to the example infra note 24.
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C. Measures of Performance for Group Decisionmaking
These models of group decisionmaking embody distinct purposes, and
hence suggest distinct measures of performance. In judgment aggregation
contexts, the principal measure of performance is accuracy: the tendency
of a group decisionmaking process to reach "correct" results. In any judg-
ment aggregation situation, there are, by hypothesis, results that can be
understood as either correct or incorrect, because the decisions of individu-
als are being received and aggregated with the view of approaching some
extrinsic truth or of meeting some communally accepted criteria of evalua-
tion. But it bears emphasizing that the notion of correctness, of accuracy,
need not rest on any philosophically significant proposition about the exis-
tence of particular forms of truth. The rightness or wrongness of possible
outcomes in any given judgment aggregation context may be dependent
upon culture, context, politics, or the purely artificial constructs of a game
or geometry.14 There may be many or few correct answers, or a single
correct answer. Accuracy is the ability to "get it right," however that fa-
vored outcome is defined or derived.
The principal measure of performance in preference aggregation is the
ability of a particular process to reflect correctly the preferences of the
members of the decisionmaking group. We will refer to this measure as
authenticity.
"Fit" is the principal measure of performance in a representative deci-
sionmaking process. By fit, we mean the tendency of the active decision-
making group to arrive at results that would have been reached by the
process' reference group.
The representation model of group decisionmaking and the concomitant
notion of fit suggest a fourth measure of performance by which group
processes may be judged-reliability. By reliability, we mean the absence
of bad surprises: outcomes that differ dramatically from the result that
would have been reached by the reference group. Thus, reliability mea-
sures a certain kind of stability of performance. This notion is suggested
by representation because an important quality of representation, not cap-
tured in our formal rendition of the model, is the sense that the goal of
reaching decisions that sit relatively comfortably with the reference group
is as or more important than the aspirational goal of perfect fit. The polit-
14. Hart's example of scoring a game, see supra note 3, again provides a revealing example.
Consider the pick-up basketball games that are played virtually continuously (during good weather)
on the courts on Sixth Avenue between Third and Fourth Streets in Manhattan. During the course of
a particular game, the rules of basketball define the "right" or "true" score at each moment of time.
Clearly, any "truth" here is constructed, i.e., internal to the social practices of a particular culture and
to the use of various English words. Yet, ask a spectator the score and she will render her judgment
about it, not express her preference.
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ical centrism implied by this goal may extend to and limit the purity of
preference and judgment aggregation group decisionmaking enterprises as
well; concern for political acceptability may outweigh (or at least modify)
our concerns for the revelation of true preferences or the making of correct
judgments.
A fifth quality of any decisionmaking process could be treated as a
measure of its performance: appearance. By appearance we mean the ten-
dency of a decisionmaking process to inspire belief among those affected
by the resulting decisions that those decisions are proper. Appearance is
not a freestanding quality; in group decisionmaking contexts, the question
would be one of apparent accuracy, fit, reliability, or authenticity. One
should not, however, mistake controversy over the appropriate substantive
goal for the decisionmaking process with problems of appearance. Some-
one who believes that adjudication should aggregate preferences will dis-
approve of decisions based on and appearing as judgment aggregation.
These models, of course, are clean and simple, while the world is
neither. Many, perhaps most, decisionmaking groups include among their
functions all three enterprises identified here. We may think that Con-
gress should act as a representative group when making appropriations, as
a judgment-aggregating body when considering the constitutionality of its
acts, and as a preference-aggregating body when setting its work schedule
or establishing certain procedural rules. The point of isolating these enter-
prises in separate models is not to suggest otherwise; rather, it is to facili-
tate a better understanding of each enterprise in turn.
The world does not neatly conform to our models in another, more
problematic respect. Members (or observers) of any particular decision-
making body may disagree radically over how to understand, in terms of
these models, a particular decisionmaking exercise. Such disagreement, for
example, occurs frequently in discussions of adjudication, and of whether
legislators should exercise their own judgment in resolving controversial
issues or should "simply" represent the interests of their constituents. Res-
olution of any disagreement depends upon what purpose we ascribe to the
decisionmaking body. Before any satisfactory evaluation of a particular
group decisionmaking process can be undertaken, a prior understanding of
the nature of that group's proper purpose or purposes must be in place.
Such an understanding of courts and the adjudicatory process is the sub-
ject of the next section.
III. THE FUNCTIONS OF ADJUDICATION
It is common to understand theories of adjudication as lying along a
spectrum defined by the reach and force of legal authority, by the extent
to which one understands judges as bound or unbound by materials resi-
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dent in the legal system. At the free, alegal end of the spectrum, realism
views judges as charting their own individual courses unencumbered by
law in all respects but form, and apparently sees no vice in this practical
necessity. Positivism, the middle position, views judges as bound by legal
rules as far as they reach, but free to go their own ways in the not infre-
quent cases in which the extant rules leave the outcome in doubt. At the
far, fettered end of the spectrum, legalism views the legal system as con-
taining resources that, appropriately understood, dictate an outcome in
most if not all cases, and views judges as bound to mine the system for its
guidance-guidance which is, in part, to be found in notions of consis-
tency and coherence more subtle and complex than the fiat to follow the
system's announced rules. 15
This spectrum, ranging from realism and other alegalist positions at
one end to legalism at the other, informs but does not parallel our distinc-
tions among the three models of group decisionmaking. The legalist posi-
tion commits one to a judgment aggregation view of adjudication. If the
job of judges in all or virtually all cases is to mine the legal system for
"right" answers, then, in setting up courts, we seek a structure that im-
proves their tendency to produce the right results-the quality of accu-
racy. This easy start suggests that as we move away from legalism we
move away from the idea that there are right and wrong answers to legal
questions, and hence away from the view that judicial decisionmaking is
an exercise in judgment aggregation. On this account, positivist courts
would be in the business of judgment aggregation only up to the point
where legal rules leave off, and realist courts would never be so engaged.
But this tidy rendition overlooks an important distinction between two
alegalistic positions, which might be called wise person alegalism and ni-
hilistic alegalism.
Suppose a tribunal of three Wise Persons adjudicates the disputes of an
appropriately small society. They do so after full discussion among them-
selves, and they write opinions containing their judgments and rationales.
In the end, each Wise Person solemnly votes and reasons along the lines
dictated by her understanding of what result is "best" for the society.
15. Some realists, such as Jerome Frank, represent the free end of the spectrum, while Ronald
Dworkin exemplifies the legalism end. Compare J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)
with R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). H.L.A. Hart lies in the middle. H. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (1961). Other important themes in American jurisprudence can be mapped onto this spec-
trum. The sharp divergence in perspective between Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842),
and Justice Brandeis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), for example, has its roots in
Story's legalism and Brandeis' streak of realism. Contemporary debate about the legitimate scope of
constitutional adjudication is often moved by open or tacit controversy about the extent to which
judges are understood to derive or to invent constitutional norms. In discourse of this sort, as one
moves towards the realist end of the spectrum, the emphasis shifts from the importance and content of
law towards the importance and integrity of judges.
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How would such a process differ from the legalist view of adjudication?
Missing, at a minimum, would be two related elements of the legalist
view. First, the resources upon which each Wise Person can draw are not
limited to the set of legal materials; however that set is defined in a partic-
ular version of legalism, it will be somewhat more limited than the set of
materials available to each Wise Person. Second, each Wise Person is free
to go her own way, despite prior decisions of the tribunal.1" Rationality
requires Wise Persons generally to be consistent, but this requirement
obliges each Wise Person to attend to her own prior decisions, not the
corporate decisions of the tribunal of which she is a part.
One alegalist view of adjudication regards judges as very much like
Wise Persons. Judges on this account decide cases, or at least ought to
decide cases, on the basis of their individual views of all those matters that
bear on the question of what outcome and what articulated rationale are
best for their society.
For our purposes, what is interesting about this Wise Person version of
alegal adjudication is that judges are understood to be making judgments
about what is the best outcome for their society, not merely expressing
their preference as to which outcome would best suit them personally. In
contrast, the other view of the unfettered judge, nihilism, holds that we
ought not seek or expect "correct" judgments from judges, either because
there is no meaningful sense in which judicial decisions can be qualified
as right or wrong, or because judges are in any event incapable of arriving
at correct outcomes through the direct application of their judgmental
faculties.1 7
16. This license obtains at least on the occasion of the tribunal's first decision, and at least if we
imagine that it has begun doing business in a freshly minted society of some sort. These heroic
provisos are necessary because the alegal freedom of each Wise Person is subject to powerful erosive
forces. Once the tribunal of Wise Persons has begun to accumulate a body of decisions, claims of
equal treatment and reliance will gather increasing ethical force in the analysis of each Wise Person,
while paradigms of thought will shape their analyses in less explicit but highly significant ways. It
may be that the concept of such a tribunal undermines itself in a way that undermines the plausibility
of the alegalist vision.
17. Realists did not articulate their theory of adjudication in our terms, and it is thus difficult to
identify individuals who might hold (or have held) the nihilist or Wise Person version. We suspect,
however, that most realists are of the Wise Person persuasion. Karl Llewellyn, for example, in K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960), cannot be interpreted as denying either the
competence of judges to reach correct answers or the existence of better or worse solutions to legal
dilemmas. Thus, he would not appear to be a nihilistic alegalist. Arguably, he is not an alegalist at all
because his analysis of adjudication generally assumes that judges restrict their attention largely to
"legal materials" and that they adhere to some amorphous set of legal practices, which constrain and
shape their judgment. The indeterminacy thesis of critical legal studies is sometimes offered as a form
of nihilistic alegalism. Often, however, this claim is made in the context of a particular set of justifica-
tory arguments. Thus, for example, Heller argues that law and economics is incapable of providing
answers to every legal question. Heller, Is the Charitable Exemption from Property Taxation an Easy
Case?, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 183 (D. Rubinfeld ed.
1979).
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While either Wise Person or nihilist alegalism is formally available to
the positivist as a means of filling the void beyond the reach of established
rules, the nihilist approach seems poorly suited to the task. A nihilist posi-
tivist would have to believe (1) that judges were capable of determining
and following the rules of a complex legal system, but incapable of deter-
mining the correct outcome of any controversy beyond the pale of estab-
lished rules, and (2) that despite this judicial incapacity, once a court had
more or less arbitrarily set a new rule in place, that rule would and
should enjoy abiding respect in future cases.
Our discussion suggests that it is quite possible for realists and posi-
tivists to share with legalists the general view that courts are engaged in
the enterprise of judgment, that it is meaningful to regard judicial out-
comes as correct or incorrect, and that it is of course desirable that judicial
institutions be structured to maximize correct results. For the legalist and
for the Wise Person positivist and realist, accuracy-the tendency to reach
correct judgments-emerges as a core virtue of the adjudicatory process
even while they differ about the nature of the process.
Assuming courts remain more or less as we know them, what, for the
nihilist, would count as virtue for the process of adjudication? One possi-
bility is to seek from judges simply an authentic expression and tally of
their personal preferences in each dispute. But it is hard to imagine why,
without some added ingredient of value, the personal preferences of the
men and women who happen to be judges should be an even marginally
attractive source of social choice; careless bad guesses or outright lies on
the part of judges about their preferences seem as worthy a source of
choice. The same problem arises from the proposal that what we want
from judges are their honest efforts at judgment, even though we-as ni-
hilists-know those efforts to be doomed.
If the preferences of judges or their futile attempts at judgment have
value, it must be in their representative capacity as surrogates for society
as a whole. On this view, there is a correct outcome, namely that which
would be reached by the polity in a plebiscite; but judges lack the capacity
to determine that outcome. If, contrary to this nihilist-representative view,
judges enjoyed the capacity to determine the polity-favored outcome, we
would be restored to judgment aggregation, with a particular, ma-
joritarian understanding of what constituted a correct outcome. In the ni-
hilist version, judges can get it right, but only by inadvertantly mirroring
the society of which they are a part. The adjudicatory virtue for a nihilist
who held this view would be that of fit between the courts and the rest of
society.
Also available to the nihilist as an adjudicatory virtue is appearance.
Bereft of hope for decisions that are substantively correct, the nihilist
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could still seek courts so structured that their decisions impress a naive
population with their worth.
Appearance, of course, could be a virtue for the legalist or Wise Person
alegalist (either positivist or realist) as well. It is perfectly consistent to
desire both that the judicial system deliver correct judgments and that it
have the appearance of doing so. Less clear is whether it is consistent to
perceive the job of judges and the virtue of courts as that of arriving at
correct judgments, and yet see the fit between courts and the rest of society
as a virtue as well.
The identification of accuracy, authenticity (as a predicate for fit), reli-
ability, fit, and appearance as potential, positive measures of judicial per-
formance brings us to the nub of our inquiry: How, if at all, can these
qualities of adjudication be improved by increasing the number of judges
who make up a court? In what follows, we restrict our detailed attention
to the feature of accuracy and the question of why three heads might be
better than one as a means of "getting it right," or why nine might be
better than three. We adopt this focus because we, in common with most
philosophers of law, consider most adjudication to be judgment-based, and
because it is the relationship between accuracy and tribunal size that
seems most perplexing. Close consideration of the other possible measures
of judicial performance as they relate to multi-judge courts we leave for
another day."8
18. We are unable to resist some brief comments on how increasing the number of judges might
improve the quality of both preference and judgment adjudication as measured by authenticity, fit and
reliability.
A preference-based theory of adjudication raises many perplexing problems, including what it
might mean for a group to have a preference, and under what circumstances a collective choice rule
exists. Authenticity, the principal quality measure of preference-based adjudication, may be affected in
two ways by the size of the judicial panel. Smaller panels are likely to have more homogeneous
preferences and hence admit a collective choice rule. On the other hand, increasing panel size from
one to three or three to nine may improve the quality of deliberation. The panel may be better able to
identify the range of possible decisions and their attributes. Similarly, more broadly based deliberation
may clarify each judge's preferences over the set of alternative decisions.
The analysis of fit again requires distinguishing preference- from judgment-based adjudication. In
preference-based adjudication, fit as a criterion reduces to accuracy if we assume that the size of the
group does not affect the quality of deliberation. Judgment-based adjudication presents an additional
problem. The best fit for which we may hope would be that the judgmental competence of the active
group equal that of the reference group. If everyone has identical judgmental competence, fit and
accuracy again are equivalent. If, however, people differ in their judgmental competence, accuracy
implies that we should select judges with the highest judgmental competence, while fit requires us to
select judges randomly.
Reliability is the property of avoiding outrageous outlying results. Hence, the analysis of reliability
depends on the interpretation of dispersion, or unreliability, one offers. First, we might care about the
reproducibility of the result, i.e., how likely it is that a different active group drawn from the same
reference group would reach the same answer as the first active group. Reproducibility requires that
adjudication be neutral with respect to the set of judges before whom a case appears. Unless everyone
has perfect judgmental competence, perfect reproducibility is unattainable. It can be shown, however,




In judgment-based theories of adjudication, notions of consistency and
coherence cloud the general question of the accuracy of decisions and are
especially problematic features of any effort to adjust that theory to take
account of the phenomenon of multi-judge courts. Accordingly, we follow
our general discussion of accuracy with a close look at consistency and
coherence in the multi-judge context.
IV. MULTI-MEMBER COURTS AND ACCURACY
The inquiry into the relationship between court size and accuracy re-
quires consideration of two different facets of the multi-judge adjudicatory
enterprise: (1) the basic fact of aggregation-that the judgment of more
than one judge will figure in the resulting decision, and (2) the process of
deliberation. We will consider these in turn.
A. Aggregating Judgments
A highly simplified model of adjudication indicates how increasing the
number of judges can improve judicial accuracy. Suppose the following
were true of the adjudicatory process: (1) adjudicated controversies have
only two possible outcomes; (2) all judges are equally likely to choose the
correct outcome; (3) each judge is more likely to choose the correct out-
come than the incorrect one;"9 (4) simple majority rule is the voting proce-
dure; and (5) each judge's decision is independent of the other judges'
decisions. (This last condition formalizes the non-deliberational aspect of
the procedure. If deliberation matters, we would expect that one judge's
decision would affect other judges.)
Given these circumstances, we may consider each judge's decision as the
The second interpretation of dispersion, and hence reliability, raises questions beyond the adjudica-
tory model underlying the previous discussion. This alternative model seeks to formalize the concep-
tion of adjudication as selecting a position from the set of alternatives arranged along a spectrum from
"liberal" to "conservative" with a "reliable" mechanism selecting a "centrist" position. More pre-
cisely, reliability as stability assumes that courts confront more than two possible outcomes about any
two of which we say, "outcome A is within (distance) d of outcome B." If outcome A* is the outcome
that the reference group would have reached, then a decision mechanism X is more reliable than a
decision mechanism Y, if mechanism X is more likely to reach a decision close to A* than mechanism
Y. Mathematically, this criterion is, for every d, the probability that the outcome under X is within d
of A* is greater than the probability that the outcome under Y is within d of A*. If we consider
majority rule procedures in which judges are selected randomly from the reference group and the
preferances of each potential judge are single-peaked, then judicial panels will select the preferred
point of the median judge. In this case, the claim that increasing the number of judges (N) on a panel
increases the reliability of the court is equivalent to the claim that as N increases the distribution of
the median order statistic gets "tighter" around the true median. We have not succeeded in proving
this conjecture.
19. Of course, if each judge were more likely than not to get the answer wrong, we would not
seek her judgment about the outcome. As discussed infra text accompanying note 20, when we allow
different members of the panel to have different degrees of judgmental competence, our analysis re-
quires only that the mean competence exceed 'A.
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draw of a single marble from a bag with marbles of two colors (white for
a correct decision, blue for an incorrect decision), mixed in proportion to
the likelihood of any judge's choosing the correct outcome. Adding judges
simply adds draws (with replacement); as long as the proportion of white
marbles in the bag exceeds , the more draws there are, the more likely it
becomes that more than half of the marbles drawn will be colored white
or "correct." The fact that there are more judges on a panel thus implies
that the panel is more accurate, i.e., more likely to reach the correct
decision. 20
The positive relation between improved accuracy and greater number of
judges persists when we relax various of our initial assumptions. For ex-
ample, the analysis changes little when we adopt the more reasonable as-
sumption that the probability that a given judge will reach a correct deci-
sion varies among judges. If we assume that judges generally get it
right-that individual likelihoods of correct decision are drawn from a
normal distribution with mean p> and variance p(1-p)/N-then as N,
the number of judges, increases, the probability of a correct decision in-
creases as well.21 Moreover, for small groups, simple majority rule makes
it more likely that the group will produce a correct decision than that the
most competent member of the group will.22
Thus far we have assumed that the panel of judges may choose between
only two possible outcomes. Most appellate decisions conform to this re-
quirement in the sense that there will be only two possible mandates (re-
versed/affirmed or judgment for appellant/appellee).23 We may, however,
relax this assumption (believing instead that judges choose from many
20. This theorem was first published in Condorcet's 1785 Essai sur l'Application de I'Analyse a
la Probabiliti des Dicisions Rendues a la Pluraliti des Voix, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS
33 (K. Baker ed. & trans. 1976). For proofs of this result, see Grofman, Owen & Feld, Thirteen
Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261 (1983) [hereinafter Grofman]; Nitzan
& Paroush, A General Theorem and Eight Corollaries in Search of Correct Decision, 17 THEORY &
DECISION 211 (1984).
We assume that the panel always has an odd number, N = 2n + 1, of judges. Each time n
increases by 1, N increases by 2. The proofs of the theorems stated in the text thus proceed by
induction on n.
21. In terms of the example above, we now have N judges with N bags. Although we do not know
the proportion of white marbles to blue marbles in each bag, we do know that if we dumped them all
together we would have the same proportion as before.
22. Grofman, supra note 20, and Nitzan & Paroush, supra note 20, offer proofs of this result.
Corollary 1 to Theorem V in Grofman, supra note 20, at 268, states: "If judgmental competence is
normally distributed with mean)T and variance given by [T(1-T)/N], then we obtain results essentially
identical" to those when p = p for all panel members-the equal competence assumption.
The result related to Theorem XI is "[i]f judgmental competence is normally distributed with mean
and variance given by [T(1-p)]/N, then it is more probable that the majority choice in small groups
(N < 35) will be correct than the judgment of the most competent member of the group ... " Id.
at 272.
23. We return to the problem of multiple outcomes below. See infra text accompanying notes
41-44.
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outcomes rather than between two judgments) without changing our con-
clusion. It will still be true for a fixed number N of judges that as the
probability of each judge's reaching a correct decision increases, the
probability of the panel's arriving at a correct decision also increases.
Moreover, if each judge is more likely than not to reach a correct decision,
then, as N increases, the probability of the panel's reaching a correct deci-
sion also increases.
Another assumption under which we have been operating so far is that
the judges will decide cases by simple majority vote. Simple majority vote
specifies that the number of votes necessary to reach a given outcome is
the smallest integer that is greater than one half of the number of voters,
N/2. The most obvious way to vary this voting procedure is to increase or
decrease the number of votes required to reach a given outcome. By doing
so, a panel of N judges would have N + 1 voting procedures among
which to choose, requiring any integer from 0 through N as the requisite
number of votes.
Without further modification of the voting procedure, the options thus
introduced have odd properties. If one adopts a sub-majority rule, the
court could reach two or more outcomes simultaneously, and these could
be starkly contradictory in nature. For all super-majority rules, the court
could fail to reach any outcome at all. Where there are only two possible
outcomes, simple majority rule emerges as uniquely decisive; it alone al-
ways identifies a single, correct outcome. But when we allow more than
two possible outcomes, this property of majority rule disappears.
In practice, sub- and super-majority rules are made workable by the
addition of favored or default states. Where sub-majority rules are at play,
typically one outcome is favored, in the sense that it will be adopted if it
receives k votes, whether or not some other outcome also receives k. The
Supreme Court's "rule of four" in certiorari grants is an example of a
favored state. Where super-majority rules are at play, one outcome is the
default state, in the sense that if no other outcome receives k votes the
default state will prevail. The Article V amendment procedure in the
Constitution is an example of the use of a default state; absent the re-
quired super-majorities, a proposed amendment fails.
Favored and default states make sub- and super-majority rules decisive.
They also make these rules nearly equivalent, in the sense that the rules
"Four votes are required to grant certiorari" and "Six votes are required
to defeat certiorari" on a nine-judge court are distinguished only by the
impact of abstentions.2
24. In fact, the Supreme Court rules are not as clear as the text suggests. While the positive votes
of four judges are required to grant certiorari, the positive votes of five judges are sufficient to lead to
a decision that certiorari was improvidently granted. The Court does not report the votes of individual
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The choice of voting procedure from among the various sub-majority,
simple majority, and super-majority options determines the type of error
that is favored in a judgment aggregation enterprise. Consider the actual
context of appellate review, where the central question of outcome is
whether the lower court is to be affirmed or reversed. Typically, appellate
courts in our legal system operate on the basis of simple majority vote; if
the number of judges is odd, this procedure is decisive on the binary ques-
tion "affirm/reverse." There is no need for either a default or a favored
state. Either possible error-affirming an incorrect decision or reversing a
correct decision-is equally possible. By adopting a different rule, "The
decision below is affirmed unless four of the five judges on this court vote
to reverse," the court would favor errors involving the affirmance of
wrong decisions and disfavor errors involving the reversal of right deci-
sions. The degree and direction of such error deflection could be adjusted
easily by adopting various sub- or super-majority procedures and
designating the appropriate favored or default states.25 Thus, explicit con-
sideration of the effect of multi-member courts and the selection of voting
rules can be crucial to understanding why a particular rule of law
emerges.
B. Deliberation
Our analysis thus far has assumed that the generation of individual
judgments or preferences in group decisionmaking contexts is hermetic,
and that the impact of the group environment is felt only at the aggrega-
tion stage. In fact, most group decisionmaking includes the exchange of
ideas and arguments under circumstances that are calculated to affect in-
dividual views. Where the collective enterprise involves judgments rather
than preferences, and where the discursive process is formal and struc-
tured-as with multi-member courts-it is often called deliberation. De-
liberation obviously can affect the attributes of a group decisionmaking
Justices on the granting of the writ; it is therefore possible that four Justices could vote to grant
certiorari and then have their wishes and their votes frustrated if the five Justices who voted against
granting certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Presumably the collegiality of the Court prevents such an outcome, as it has in a related context.
The Court requires five votes to grant a stay but only four to grant certiorari. In death-penalty cases,
this difference has great significance because failure to stay results in the execution of the petitioner
and the mooting of his case. In Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 21 (1985), Justice Powell voted, at
the last minute, to stay an execution since his failure to do so would have frustrated a previous grant
of certiorari supported by only four other Justices.
25. This designation of default states may play a particularly important role in attempts to main-
tain coherence in a legal system. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34. Errors in one direction
may be perceived to do much greater violence to the fabric of the system than errors in the other
direction.
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process; more particularly, it can affect the accuracy of judicial
decisionmaking.
In the course of deliberation, judges can be expected to advance argu-
ments in support of a particular result in the case before the court. Argu-
ments serve two functions in legal analysis: they are both the reason that a
judge reaches (or abandons) a particular result, and the announced ration-
ale for having done so, carrying implications for the outcome of future
cases. The process of testing any such argument includes canvassing the
alternative arguments, elaborating the consequences of these arguments,
and discussing the criteria of validity. Unless one presupposes that judges
enter this process either fully aware of all points and counterpoints, or
obdurately fixed on both result and rationale without reference to the full
range of possible argumentation, it must be the case that some judges
emerge from the deliberative process with judgments about the appropri-
ate result or rationale different from their initial ones.
Deliberation could affect the behavior of any given judge in at least
three different ways. First, a judge may become more fully aware of the
range of rationales for one or another possible result and, in some cases,
more fully aware of possible results; in this sense her judgment set will
have been expanded by deliberation. Second, deliberation may convince a
judge that there are good reasons to change her mind. A more complete
understanding of the consequences of adopting a particular rule would be
a commonplace reason for a change of this nature; less common perhaps,
but more dramatic, would be exposure to an entirely different perspective
on a given problem, as where a judge is persuaded to reconceive as a torts
problem a case she had originally characterized as a breach of contract.
Third, the communal pressures of deliberation may induce in a given
judge a conscious or unconscious impulse to conform her judgment to a
range of results that her colleagues treat as acceptable.2"
26. The impact of deliberation on adjudication seems at least in part redundant: the adversarial
process also serves to enumerate alternatives and to frame the context in which a judge exercises her
judgment or asserts her preferences. Closer inspection reveals that deliberation and adversarial ex-
changes may complement each other. While each party will advocate positions most favorable to it,
this advocacy ensures that any biases of the judges are exposed to conflicting arguments and views.
Similarly, the judges cannot make a simple neutral choice between the arguments offered by each side.
The adversaries may urge rationales that have no common ground.
Our conception of the role of the judge and the function of adjudication also suggests why the
process might include both deliberation and adversarial argument. Our conception of the judge as
arbiter implies, as noted above, that she should formulate the decision or judgment problem neutrally
as between the parties. Our understanding that judicial decisions affect parties not before the court
and our conception of just treatment of these unrepresented parties argues that judges should consider
the interests of those parties not before the court because the adversarial process will not necessarily
produce arguments and options favorable to these persons.
Of course, the adversarial process serves other functions in addition to deliberative ones. It allows
the parties most directly affected by the judgment to participate in the process and hence may enhance
the perception of fairness and legitimacy of the outcome.
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Although we have identified ways in which deliberation might have a
significant impact on judges and their judgments, we have not demon-
strated that deliberation improves the accuracy of judicial decisions. De-
liberation in a reflective community exposes individuals to seriously main-
tained ideas and arguments that they previously overlooked or treated
summarily; these ideas and arguments, of course, may be good or bad.
Deliberation also generates communal pressure to eschew ideas and argu-
ments that fall outside the range acceptable to the community; such radi-
cal ideas and arguments, again, may be aberrant and wrong, or innovative
and correct.
Thus, if we favor deliberation as a means of improving group judg-
ment, it must be because we assume that its judgment-enhancing aspects
outweigh its judgment-impairing features. Our reasons may include the
view that ignorance of useful ideas or arguments is a greater hazard to the
capacity of reflective individuals to form correct judgments than exposure
to false ideas or arguments, or the view that the deliberative process will
do more good in exposing obvious errors and restraining mad acts than
harm in suppressing novelty. Demonstrating the validity of these proposi-
tions is complex, partly empirical, and beyond our resources here, but the
general assumption favoring deliberation as an aid to correct judgment
seems reasonable in light of common experience.
V. CONSISTENCY, COHERENCE, AND GROUP DECISIONMAKING
In many judgment-based theories of adjudication, "getting it right" en-
tails maintaining a particular, substantive relationship between the deci-
sions of individual cases. The required relationship is sometimes described
as "consistency," sometimes as "coherence," and is commonly understood
to be a necessary condition of correct outcomes. Though the terms "consis-
tency" and "coherence" are often used loosely and interchangeably, we
think they entail two related, but distinct concepts. In this section, we
explore consistency and coherence in the context of multi-member courts.
Specifically, we ask whether a panel of judges, each of whom has a consis-
tent and coherent view of the law, will, when they aggregate their judg-
ments, produce a consistent and coherent pattern of decisions.
27. To our knowledge, only one prior work has approached these questions in any detail. See
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982). Judge Easterbrook's
discussion differs dramatically from ours on a variety of grounds. First, he does not distinguish be-
tween consistency and coherence, a distinction we believe fundamental to the understanding of adjudi-
cation. Second, we consider explicitly situations in which the application of criteria for coherence are
path-dependent and in which the judicial view of the law evolves over time. Third, and perhaps most
fundamental, Easterbrook views the court as engaged in preference aggregation, rather than judgment
aggregation. ("Each group of Justices, moreover, has a preference between the two positions taken by
the others." Id. at 815.) These differences render impossible a point-by-point comparison of the two
Vol. 96: 82, 1986
Unpacking the Court
We begin by defining the concepts of consistency and coherence in the
context of the decisions of a single judge. Of the two concepts, consistency
is easier to grasp and imposes a less stringent requirement. For our pur-
poses, consistency is simply the state of non-contradiction, and two legal
rules are inconsistent if and only if they are contradictory. Thus, any two
of these three rules are inconsistent:
(1) Given circumstances A, B, and C, a landlord is obligated to avoid
doing X.
(2) Given circumstances A, B, and C, a landlord is under no obliga-
tion with regard to the doing of X.
(3) Given A, B, and C, a landlord is obligated to do X.2"
This simple, straightforward understanding of consistency grows more
complex when applied to a sequence of decisions by a single judge. Sup-
pose we have a small state with one judge, Liza (who is an infallible
arbiter of factual disputes). When Liza decides controversies brought
before her, she simply recites an elaborate statement of the factual circum-
stances surrounding the controversy ("the story") and announces the out-
come, such as that the landlord must pay her tenant Sy, or $0, nothing at
all ("the ruling"). In such a world, it is hard to understand how Liza's
decisions could ever be inconsistent. "Rules" in this world consist of
matched pairs of extensively described controversies and the associated
outcomes; they read "If [story] then [ruling]." Because the date of the
events, the parties involved, or other details will differ, no two stories will
be exactly alike, and thus no two rules can be directly contradictory or
inconsistent.
Judges in legal realms familiar to us, however, do not behave like Liza.
They write opinions that purport to announce and justify the applicable
legal rule or rules."9 In contrast to Liza's matched stories and rulings,
articles. But we do take issue directly with Easterbrook's central claim that multi-member courts are
organically prone to inconsistent behavior. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
28. However, two rules are not made inconsistent simply because they might operate to place the
same individual under inconsistent obligations:
Given A, B, and C, a landlord is obligated to do X.
Given C, D, and E, a landlord is obligated to avoid doing X.
It is quite possible in a consistent regime of rules for an individual to burden herself with contrary
obligations, as when a landlord enters into binding agreements both to do and to refrain from the
same act.
29. The criteria for the determination of the ratio decidendi, or holding, of a case have received
extensive, if inconclusive, analysis in the jurisprudential literature. See, e.g., R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977). Broadly speaking, one may identify two approaches. The first, inti-
mated in the sentence to which this footnote is appended, takes seriously the stated rationales of the
judges themselves. The second approach, more consistent with the view of adjudication implicit in the
discussion of this section as a whole, focuses on the pattern of facts and associated outcomes of the
cases. It has as its source the legal realist movement with K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION (1960), providing perhaps the best example. In this latter approach, the rule announced
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these rules isolate and identify the particular circumstances that are rele-
vant to the stipulated legal consequences."0 Legal rules thus assume the
abstract form "If q then r," where q is the set of those circumstances
sufficient to bring about r, which in turn is the set of all legal conse-
quences comprehended by the rule. When the circumstances of legal con-
troversies relevant to the outcome are isolated and identified in this fash-
ion, the resulting rules are abstract enough to allow one to generate and
predict future outcomes. In such an environment the concept of inconsis-
tency once again becomes meaningful. Where two legal rules attach differ-
ent legal consequences to the same stipulated set of relevant circumstances
the rules are inconsistent.31
So understood, consistency is not hard to justify as a virtue. It serves the
goal of treating persons subject to the adjudicatory process fairly, and is
essential to the ability of affected persons to anticipate legal outcomes and
plan their affairs accordingly. It is our desire for consistency that in sig-
nificant part animates and shapes the rule of stare decisis.
by a judge may not articulate the true rationale for the decision; rather, the rule of law must be
extracted from a careful examination and comparison of the fact patterns and outcomes of closely
related cases. The realist method, of course, remains dependent upon a judge's actual words, because
the pattern of facts analyzed is extracted from the opinion of the prior judge. Moreover, the an-
nounced rules of judges are generally good evidence of the true rules and, in any event, reflect the
rule-oriented thinking and behavior of judges generally.
30. Most aspects of a litigated event are generally considered irrelevant to the determination of the
legal consequences. For example, the dates of birth of the parties, the color of the defendant's hair, her
educational background, and, often, many of the social relations between the parties have no bearing
on the formulation of the legal rule. Formally, the typical rule introduces some quantification over
these "irrelevant" aspects of a story. That is, to state fully the legal rule that party A who fails to
deliver to party B a contracted-for widget on a specified date is legally liable for damages, one must
append a variety of suppressed clauses that identify the scope of various terms in the statement of the
rule. For example, the usual statement of the legal rule omits, among others, the clauses "regardless of
the name of party A, regardless of the name of party B, regardless of the hair color of A and of B,
.... " Logic allows us to formulate these rules by stating that the legal rule applies to every situation
that meets certain conditions. Thus, the contract example noted above might have a structure some-
thing like "for every person A and for every person B such that A made an offer at time t1 and B
accepted such offer at time t 2 (after t) for a given consideration, if A failed to meet the terms of the
offer, then. ... Of course, to state completely a simple rule in this form presents grave difficulties.
In the example above, we would have to define the terms "offer," "acceptance," and "consideration"
as well as spell out the salient aspects of A's actual offer and the types of conduct that conformed to
the terms. We might represent this complex formulation of a simple rule with the following form:
"For every date t (or series of dates t1, t2, . . . tn with ti < t- when i < j), and for every pair of
people x and y with the properties P(xy), Q(xy), and S(xy) tien r." Of course, the rule might be
more complex. It may involve relations among more than two parties and more than two properties.
31. A legal rule assumes the rough form "If [pertinent circumstances] then [legal consequence]."
In the example above, see supra text accompanying note 28, the inconsistent legal rules have identical
circumstantial parts and differ only in the legal consequence. Specifically, the legal consequence of one
belongs to the set of legal consequences defined by the negation of the other. Inconsistency may arise,
however, even when the circumstantial parts of the legal rule differ. Such inconsistency can arise
because two legal rules give different scope to some variables. See supra note 28. For example, the
abstractly phrased rulep, which provides that "For each a,j(a,b*) implies q" is inconsistent with the
rulef, which provides that "For each a and for each b,f(a,b) implies not-q." Assuming that b* is a b,
the antecedent (or [circumstance]) of the latter rule implies that for every a,J(a,b*) is true and thus
the two rules are inconsistent. That is, whenever b=b*, the two rules would require q and not-q.
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Nor is consistency particularly hard to achieve, at least in a one-judge
world. But even in such a world inconsistency could occur by mistake or
design. Concurrent inconsistency-the simultaneous existence of two con-
tradictory rules-presumably can only be the product of error. But con-
secutive inconsistency-the recognition first of one rule and later of a con-
tradictory successor can well be intentional, as when a rule is abandoned
because it is thought to be fundamentally wrong, because, for example, it
detracts from the coherence of the main corpus of extant rules.32
This last suggestion brings us to the concept of coherence. Coherence is
a quality of conceptual unity. Coherence does not require that a system's
premises be correct, but it does demand that they form or reflect a unitary
vision of that portion of the world modeled by the system. A perfectly
coherent legal system would comprise normative elements derivable from
a relatively limited number of non-contradictory premises that are reason-
ably general in form and that join in a recognizable conception of social
policy.
As a virtue of systematic thought and discourse generally, coherence
stands between the purely formal quality of consistency and the substan-
tive (typically normative) quality of soundness. A system is consistent if
all of its elements are derivable from a set of non-contradictory premises.
It is sound if, in addition, those premises are correct. Coherence lies be-
tween these bounds: A coherent system must be consistent but it need not
be sound. Coherence thus brings some order and structure to what might
otherwise be a jumble of consistent propositions. This important substan-
tive restraint on a system of thought or discourse is imprecise and bound
up with the intellectual culture of which it is a part.
Like consistency, coherence is not hard to justify as an adjudicatory vir-
tue. It serves the same goals of treating persons subject to the adjudicatory
process fairly and enabling such persons to anticipate legal outcomes and
plan their affairs accordingly.
An example may clarify our discussion of the concept of coherence.
Judge Skelly Wright's recognition of an implied warranty of habitability
in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,33 which wrought a major change in
landlord-tenant law, is grounded in a judicial appeal to coherence. Under
the pre-Javins common law, two perfectly consistent but very different
rules were well-established: One governed landlord-tenant relationships;
32. Consecutive inconsistency can only arise in a single judge world if the judge, at the time she
starts, has an incomplete vision of what the appropriate body of legal rules should be. If she knew at
the outset what the "right body of legal rules" was, the sequence of cases would simply provide the
order of announcement of the rules. In a multi-judge world, consecutive inconsistency might arise even
among judges each of whom had a complete vision of the body of law, because their visions might
differ.
33. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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the other governed most of the remaining universe of bilateral promissory
relationships. Rather than ground his decision in extrinsic policy claims,
Judge Wright reasoned from the pull of material already resident in the
legal system. Recognition of the implied warranty of habitability was un-
derstood as eliminating a major source of incoherence in the law of bilat-
eral promissory relationships.
Javins illustrates the tension that can exist between consistency and co-
herence. Consistency is a necessary condition of coherence, and hence the
perfectly coherent legal system would also be perfectly consistent. But in
an imperfectly coherent system, coherence and consecutive consistency can
conflict. 4 Thus, inJavins, Skelly Wright could be consistent by following
well-established precedent in landlord-tenant law, or coherent by bringing
landlord-tenant law into line with promissory relationships generally. He
could not be both.
The tension between consistency and coherence has interesting implica-
tions for an adjudicatory system. Suppose Liza is the only judge in a com-
mon law state, and that over the course of her judicial career she has
decided hundreds of cases. She may decide case 51, involving a compli-
cated and arcane issue of tort law, and then not encounter the same issue
again until case 451. By the time case 451 presents itself, she may realize
that a long line of her decisions in the contracts area has important impli-
cations for the 51/451 issue, implications directly contrary to her decision
in 51. Coherence and consistency would conflict here, as in Javins, and
we can well imagine Liza preferring coherence to consistency. Of course,
if from the outset Liza is preternaturally able to anticipate all her future
cases or in some other way able to behave with perfect coherence through-
out her career, the problem will never arise. But even our idealized Liza
can encounter the problem if we take a step from our one-judge world to
a world a little more real, and posit a legal system with a number of
judges, each of whom sits alone and each of whom has equal authority.
34. The claim of the text rests on the following understanding of coherence. Consider two ideal-
ized bodies of law, each consistent and minimally coherent. The first body of law corresponds in
general to the pre-Javins state of the law, which treats landlord-tenant relationships differently than
other bilateral promissory relations. The second body of law corresponds to the post-Javins world,
and treats all bilateral promissory relations in a unitary way. This post-Javins legal corpus is ideal-
ized in the sense that it does not contain those cases decided prior to Javins that were inconsistent
with the unitary view of bilateral promises. The claim is that the post-Javins corpus better satisfies
the criteria of coherence than the pre-Javins corpus. Although each body of law may be derivable
from some smaller set of principles, the claim of greater coherence need not be a claim that the post-
Javins set of generative principles is logically consistent while the pre-Javins set is not. In an ideal-
ized body of law, the generative set is by hypothesis consistent. But even such idealized sets will differ
in the degree to which they satisfy non-logical criteria embodying, for example, our norms of simplic-
ity, unity, and elegance.
The decision inJavins, of course, could not yield a perfectly consistent body of law. It introduces a
landlord-tenant rule consecutively inconsistent with the prior landlord-tenant rule. It does so to ad-
vance the goal of greater coherence.
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Now, if Liza decides case 51 and returns to the same issue in case 451,
she has to contend with an intervening body of decisions including the
decisions of Judges A, B, C, D, etc. Even if Liza's colleagues have be-
haved consistently with the rule of case 51, they may have decided other
cases that raise problems of coherence, and when Liza returns to the issue
in 451, she may well confront a clash between coherence and consistency.
Since the commands of consistency and coherence may well point in
opposite directions on occasion, it follows that we cannot insist or expect
that judges always behave consistently and coherently. It also follows that
adjudication that seeks to be faithful to the requirements of consistency
and coherence will display the quality of path-dependence; that is, adjudi-
cated outcomes may vary depending on when they are decided. If an issue
comes up as number n it may be decided one way by a conscientious and
perfectly competent judge, but if it comes up as number n +m it may be
decided differently by the same judge. Path-dependence is a kind of irra-
tionality closely connected with inconsistency, and carries with it a paral-
lel sense of unfairness. Like the trade-off between coherence and consis-
tency, however, it is endemic to systems of adjudicated outcomes, whether
participating tribunals are staffed by a single judge or by groups of judges,
except in the nonexistent world of a preternaturally perfect, single judge
(who lives forever!).
When we turn to multi-member courts, the analysis of a panel's ability
to achieve consistent and coherent decisions becomes more complex. Some
believe that multi-member courts cannot achieve consistency at all. The
argument against the consistency of multi-member courts rests on the pos-
sibility that judges on a multi-member court may disagree on the rules
applicable to the decisions of specific cases, and that this disagreement will
lead to a reeling inconsistency, with the court lurching from rule to con-
tradictory rule. 5
35. Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 814-817, presents the argument for inconsistency. He relies on
Arrow's Theorem, and in particular on the problem of "cycling." The problem of cycling is intro-
duced if we imagine a three judge court, with the judges obliged to choose among three rationales, A,
B, and C. Each judge ranks these rationales in order of preference (where A > B denotes that





Easterbrook apparently conceives of a court under such a circumstance conducting a series of futile
pairwise votes, pursuant to which these discomforting results would emerge:
Rule B would beat Rule A (Judges S & T vs. Judge R)
Rule C would beat Rule B (Judges R & T vs. Judge S)
Rule A would beat Rule C (Judges R & S vs. Judge T)
Rule B would beat Rule A . ..
and so on endlessly, unless the court chose a wholly arbitrary place to stop. This is the problem of
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This argument is false. Assuming that each judge on a multi-member
court decides cases consistently, then the court as a whole will decide cases
consistently. Consider the case most likely to lead to inconsistency, one in
which each judge on the panel is firmly committed to a different rule.
Suppose that, on a three-judge court, Judge A holds that commercial
speech is unprotected by the First Amendment, and that regulations of
other speech are constitutional only if they are content-neutral and sup-
ported by legitimate governmental concerns; Judge B holds that all speech
is absolutely protected; and Judge C holds that the non-commercial speech
of natural persons is absolutely protected, commercial speech is subject to
reasonable regulation, and that the speech of juridical entities is unpro-
tected. Suppose further that three state laws are challenged on First
Amendment grounds; these laws respectively ban: (1) "false or mislead-
ing" advertisements, (2) leaflets in any public place (because of litter), and
(3) corporate participation in legislative referendum campaigns. We
would get the following voting pattern from our judges:
LAW: False Advertising Public Places Referenda
JUDGE:
A OK OK BAD
B BAD BAD BAD
C OK BAD OK
PANEL: OK BAD BAD
Should any of the three cases recur, the court will decide it as it decided
that case the first time. Specifically, it will approve of laws banning false
advertising and disapprove of laws banning leafletting in public spaces
and corporate participation in referendum campaigns. Thus, though this
court lacks a majority rationale, it has a consistent rule.36 Its rule, while
cycling, which is a critical element in Arrow's Theorem and forms the heart of Easterbrook's claim.
But as our analysis of a radically fractured court will demonstrate, see infra text accompanying note
36, a perfectly stable voting pattern emerges from such a court. If the individual judges decide cases
consistently, like cases will be decided alike, and no problem of consistency presents itself.
36. This table provides a useful visual means of depicting not just consistency but coherence as
well. Consistency is a logical relationship between events that depends simply on the stability of the
vertical elements in the table. Thus, if in each case involving a ban on false and misleading advertising
that vertical line is constant, with Judges A, B, and C maintaining their respective positions, the court
will adjudicate the case in the same way, and consistency will result. Coherence-to anticipate our
discussion-is a substantive relationship along the horizontal elements of the table. For a given judge,
say Judge A, to be coherent she must maintain a particular relationship among her votes in these
three sorts of cases; for the court to be coherent, the outcomes in the bottom horizontal line must enjoy
that same substantive relationship. Coherence demands that the horizontal results be derivable from
some unitary set of principles or embedded in some structured theory. The rule of any given judge, or
of the court, is coherent only if it constitutes a formulation of First Amendment doctrine that satisfies
this requirement. Moreover, even if each judge decides all three cases coherently, it does not follow
that the court's outcomes will be coherent. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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different from the rule of each judge, derives from the rules followed by
Judges A, B, and C in a regular and predictable way. Namely, the court
outcome in a given case is the outcome common to a majority of the
judges. We can state the rule clearly:
Regulations of speech are unconstitutional except a) reasonable reg-
ulations of all commercial speech and b) content-neutral regulations
of the noncommercial speech of juridical entities, if the regulations
are supported by legitimate governmental concerns.
If each of our three judges applies her rule consistently, the court will
apply its amalgamated rule consistently. The suggestion that multi-
member courts cannot act consistently is simply false, even in the context
of this worst-case, fractured court.37
37. Easterbrook's contrary claim, supra note 27, relies on social choice theory. See, e.g., K. AR-
ROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND
SOCIAL WELFARE (1970). In particular, he draws on a theorem first proven by Arrow. This theorem,
as applied by Easterbrook to adjudication, imposes various restrictions on the choice problem faced by
the panel of judges. Specifically, it requires (1) that they be choosing among at least three alternatives;
(2) that each judge have a complete and transitive ordering of the alternatives; and (3) that the aggre-
gation mechanism used by the panel meet five conditions: (a) it must produce a complete and transi-
tive (panel) ranking of all the alternatives; (b) the mechanism must produce such ranking regardless
of the pattern of individual rankings of the judges (universal domain); (c) if the ranking of any pair of
alternatives is unanimous among the judges, the aggregation mechanism must rank that pair of alter-
natives the same way (pareto criterion) (termed "unanimity" by Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 823);
(d) the mechanism cannot identify the panel ranking simply by the ranking of a particular judge
(nondictatorship); and (e) in determining the panel ranking of two alternatives A and B, the aggrega-
tion mechanism may use only information about the order of A and B in each judge's own ranking
(independence of irrelevant alternatives). Id. at 823. Given these conditions, Easterbrook argues that
differential rankings of alternatives by individual judges on a multi-member panel will result in in-
consistent decisions.
While Easterbrook assumes that judges choose among multiple rationales, most of our discussion
assumes that judges make a binary choice between judgment for plaintiff and judgment for defendant.
As our discussion of the multiple outcome case shows, our disagreement with Easterbrook, however,
lies deeper than disagreement over the number of options open to a judge. Rather, we differ from
Easterbrook in our demands both on individual judges and on the aggregation mechanism itself to
have (or to produce) rankings of all alternatives. In our analysis, each judge must be able to make the
set of judgments specified by the aggregation mechanism; she must choose only the outcome she thinks
best or correct. Thus each judge need not have a complete, transitive ordering over the alternatives.
(This ordering would be an ordering of judgments, such as, for example, "alternative A is more
correct than alternative B.") This point is most apparent in our discussion of a choice among three
alternatives. See infra text accompanying note 41. More importantly, we do not demand that the
aggregation mechanism yield a panel ranking of the alternatives. It need only choose one. Easterbrook
requires each judge and the panel to have a complete (preference) ordering over all alternatives.
For a number of reasons, we feel that our model of adjudication provides a sounder basis than
Easterbrook's for a normative theory of adjudication. First, Easterbrook's model treats the existence of
more than two alternatives in a somewhat odd way. While each judge has preferences over all alterna-
tives, she is presented choices pairwise. On Easterbrook's interpretation of alternatives as rationales,
such a restriction makes little sense. Judges simply are not asked in case A to choose between ratio-
nales I and II, in case B between rationales II and III, and in case C between rationales I and III. All
of the rationales are available to the judge in each case; in each instance, she is asked to choose the
best outcome. As we show below, the sequence of cases may present her with problems of coherence
but not of consistency. Second, the panel has no need to generate a ranking of all possible rationales; it
must select only one. Again, as emerges below, although courts might adopt a mechanism that did
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So far, we have been considering the case of a court so badly fractured
that it cannot produce a majority opinion and thus cannot produce an
announced rule to govern future cases and command the allegiance prom-
ised by stare decisis. One apparent problem of consistency posed by multi-
judge courts involves those cases where there is a majority opinion: in such
cases, how can we account for concurring38 and dissenting opinions? Su-
perficially, such opinions may appear to implicate concurrent inconsis-
tency, since the judges who author them necessarily favor rules different
than those adopted as law by the majority.
But, of course, a concurring or dissenting opinion does not actually in-
stall any rule in the legal system; it is merely a judge's announcement of
how she would decide the case were she the only judge or were she able to
convince a majority of her colleagues. Accordingly, the problems of consis-
tency involved in authoring such an opinion are in no sense particular to
the multi-judge court context.
A single judge, facing a novel question, has no problem of consistency,
and neither does a judge on a multi-judge court who disagrees with her
colleagues; a majority of them agree on rule A, she would choose rule B,
and her opinion merely recites this circumstance and advances her reasons
for disagreeing with the majority rule. A single judge who disagrees with
an established rule does have a problem of consecutive inconsistency. She
may regard the rule as intrinsically bad, or as a source of incoherence, as
did Skelly Wright in Javins; in either event, she can alter the rule only at
produce a complete ranking of alternatives, it seems silly to do so when such a choice has no apparent
benefits and plunges one into the antinomies of Arrow's theorem.
Two other remarks are appropriate. First, our analysis, just as Arrow's and Easterbrook's (except
for a few comments, see Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 821-23), ignores strategic behavior on the part
of judges. As it stands, therefore, our analysis is more appropriate as the basis for a normative, rather
than a positive, theory of adjudication. Most jurisprudential theories of adjudication are, of course,
normative. In addition, even for a positive theory, an analysis of sincere adjudication must normally
precede one that addresses the additional complexities posed by sophisticated judges acting
strategically.
Much of the plausibility of Easterbrook's approach derives from its grounding in preference aggre-
gation. In that context, we desire that the panel ranking "authentically" reflect the rankings of the
judges. In judgment aggregation, however, we seek not a reflection of the judges' rankings, but the
correct judgment. Consequently, many of the conditions imposed on the aggregation mechanism seem
inappropriate in the judgment context. If one judge were infallible, then dictatorship (by the infalli-
ble) would be a desirable rather than an undesirable characteristic of an aggregation mechanism.
Much the same conclusion might apply if the competence of each judge were known and if one judge
were significantly more competent than the others. Similarly, the requirement of independence of
irrelevant alternatives seems inapplicable. Each judge makes her judgment based on the relevant crite-
ria for making the judgment, not based on how alternative A compares to alternative B.
Second, none of the above argues that Arrow's theorem or social choice theory in general is
"wrong" or "false." We contend, rather, that it does not provide the appropriate model in which to
analyze judicial decisionmaking.
38. The problem can only be understood to involve "true" concurring opinions, where judges
disagree with the majority, not "two cents" concurring opinions, where judges agree with the majority
but add observations of their own.
Unpacking the Court
the price of consecutive inconsistency. Likewise, a judge on a multi-judge
court can disagree with a previously announced rule only at the same
price. But the problem is in no sense specific to multi-judge courts or to
concurring and dissenting opinions. It is merely an artifact of institutional
arrangements that respond seriously to the demands of consistency but on
occasion neglect those demands in the service of other adjudicatory virtues.
As we have seen, a multi-judge court can behave consistently. Even our
badly fractured court will be consistent if each of our three judges acts
consistently. It does not follow, however, that if our three disagreeing
judges act coherently the court will also be coherent. There is no reason to
infer from the fact that each judge's rule is legitimately derivable from a
small set of general, consistent, and unitary premises that the court's
amalgamated rule is similarly derivable. It is possible, for example, that
the axiom set from which each judge's rule derives rests on a different
conception of the appropriate basis for decision than the rules of the other
judges.
The extent to which incoherence will plague a multi-member court will
depend in part on how each judge conceives her role. The most serious
problem will arise if no judge believes that she has a duty to accommodate
her judgment in a case before her to prior decisions of the court which she
believes were wrongly decided. In this circumstance, each judge would
hold a coherent view of what the law should be but would feel no obliga-
tion to render coherent the actual series of legal outcomes. Both Judge A
and Judge B in the First Amendment example above adhered to their
views of the First Amendment even though, by the time the referenda case
arose, both Judge A and Judge B would have viewed the prevailing law
as incorrect. They strove for the correct outcome in the case before them
and ignored any demand for coherence in the system of prevailing legal
rules. Although judges do not completely ignore the demands of coherence
in the legal system, they may frequently adhere for a time to a view of the
law at odds with recent decisions and only later strive for coherence. But
our example shows that even a brief (three case) period of obstinacy may
lead to an incoherent body of law. 9
39. The death penalty might exemplify the phenomenon described in the text. Both Justice Mar-
shall and Justice Brennan have announced that they will not follow the rule of stare decisis. In Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall announced their view that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the death penalty. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A computer search found 442 subsequent Supreme Court cases
containing the phrase "adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments." (LEXIS, Genfed library,
US file, Sept. 9, 1986). From this we may infer not only that they will not seek to decide a new case
in a manner consistent with the court's prior decision of an identical case, but also that they feel no
obligation to generate a coherent extension of the evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death
penalty. Put differently, they renounce any obligation to decide "similar" cases "similarly." To the
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Even in this worst case for coherence, some forces reduce the difficulties
caused by multi-judge courts. If, as we have hypothesized earlier, judges
as a group do in fact "get it right" more often than not, then we can
expect judges to tend toward the same or similar judgments. When major-
ities agree as to both outcome and rule, this rule will become the source of
claims of consistency on judges, as enshrined in the rule of stare decisis.
Consider now the case in which each judge believes coherence in the
system of legal rules is a necessary condition of getting the right answer in
the case before the court. We must examine two variations. In the first, all
judges share common criteria for coherence. Thus, if they are shown a
series of legal rules, they will agree in their judgments of the coherence of
each system of legal rules though they may disagree about which system is
the correct one. Suppose now that the sequence of decisions made by the
court is coherent. Then, if the court decides cases one at a time, the evolv-
ing legal system will continue to be coherent. This result follows because
each judge believes she must decide a case in the way that maintains the
coherence of the legal system. Even if, at some point in the decision-
making process, the judges disagree radically on how the legal system
should develop, for each particular case they will each offer a coherent
extension of the line of decisions. And the line of decisions will be ex-
tended for the purposes of that case consistently with the proffered exten-
sion of a majority of the judges. Moreover, even the judges who believe
that the decision is contrary to their conception of the way the law should
develop will view the resulting pattern of decisions as coherent. Thus,
when judges strive to maintain the coherence of the legal system and share
criteria of coherence and, in addition, the law develops in a case by case
fashion, multi-judge courts will yield coherent outcomes, even if the same
judges facing the relevant cases in isolation and for the first time would
disagree on the appropriate outcomes.
Suppose, then, that the judges do not share the same criteria of coher-
ence so that, while each strives to maintain her own conception of coher-
ence in the legal system, they may disagree over the coherence of the re-
sulting outcomes. Suppose that up to some point the judges agree that the
pattern of decisions they have made thus far is coherent. They now con-
front three cases, for example, the three First Amendment cases discussed
above. In the first case on false advertising, each judge decides according
to her own view of what is correct, which now includes the consideration
extent they occasionally attract a majority for their position, they introduce incoherence to the law.
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist has adhered to his views on procedural due process in the employment
context, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion), despite the fact that
six Justices have repudiated those views. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487,
1492 (1985) (noting that six Justices specifically rejected plurality opinion in Arnett); id. at 1502-04
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (adhering to his plurality opinion in Arnett).
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that the legal system as a whole should be as coherent as possible. The
court upholds the law but now Judge B believes the legal system is inco-
herent. When the second case on public places arises, Judges A and C
will decide it in a way that each believes will maintain the coherence of
the system as a whole, while Judge B will try to lessen the incoherence
generated by the false advertising decision. 0 After the second case is de-
cided in accordance with Judge B's and Judge C's view, Judge A will
believe the law incoherent, as may Judge B, though Judge B will regard
the law as less incoherent after the decision than before. When the refer-
enda case arises, only Judge C renders a decision that necessarily pre-
serves coherence as she sees it. Judges A and B may be forced to decide in
a way that lessens as much as possible the incoherence they perceive. But
after the decision of the referenda case where C is in the minority, Judge
C may also view the legal system as incoherent. At this point, each judge
might then view the legal system as incoherent, even though each has
striven to preserve its coherence. Thus, if radically fractured courts dis-
agree not only on the correct answer but also on the criteria for coherence,
multi-judge courts may result in incoherent rules even when each judge
strives to preserve coherence or lessen incoherence. Since the judges disa-
gree on the criteria for coherence, when a decision runs contrary to a
judge's view of the law, it may result in an incoherent continuation of the
line of decisions. If the judges disagree broadly on the criteria of coher-
ence, incoherence is likely to arise more frequently and subside less with
the passage of time.
Thus far our discussion of consistency and coherence has assumed that
every case has only two outcomes. A brief discussion of two related exam-
ples suggests that, even if cases have more than two possible outcomes,
multi-member courts, when they reach any decision at all, will be consis-
tent. These two examples also reveal the complexity of the concept of
coherence.
Suppose first that a given case has three possible outcomes: the defend-
ant might win (W), the plaintiff might get remedy 1 (Ri), or he might get
remedy 2 (R2). The multiplicity of possible outcomes, of course, does not
alter the ability of a single judge to achieve consistent (or coherent) pat-
terns of decisions. Consider then a three judge court with Judge A espous-
40. For Judge B, the table may no longer represent a true picture of how she would decide cases.
In this variation of the problem, Judge B attempts to preserve coherence; thus her view of the correct
decision of the public places and referenda cases depends upon the decision in the false advertising
case. We have assumed that considerations of preserving coherence have not led any judge, when faced
with an incoherent pattern, to alter her view of the correct decision.
It should be noted that if more than two outcomes are possible, one can more plausibly introduce
incoherence into the system because a greater range of outcomes increases the scope for disagreement
among judges over which outcomes constitute coherent continuations of the line of cases.
The Yale Law Journal
ing a rule that dictates outcome W, Judge B a rule that dictates R1, and
Judge C one that dictates R2. Unlike the case in which only two outcomes
are possible, the judges here cannot agree on a judgment. The panel deci-
sion will depend upon the default rule. For instance, one default rule
(DR1) would be that, in the absence of a majority agreement on any out-
come, defendant wins. DR1 dictates an outcome of W. Another default
rule (DR2) might divide the decision into parts. First, the panel must
decide whether plaintiff is entitled to any recovery (i.e., whether he has a
right). Only then does the panel determine the remedy to which he is
entitled. Under DR2, the outcome will depend on how Judge A votes on
the remedy question. For DR2 to be meaningful, Judge A must be able to
answer the "counterfactual": Given that plaintiff is entitled to recover,
what (in my judgment) ought he to recover in this case? Under either
DR1 or DR2, the panel will be consistent.41
We have suggested two different judicial practices to resolve the indeci-
sion in the multiple outcome case. These two practices do not exhaust the
possibilities. For instance, judges might consider their rankings of the
three different outcomes and base their decision solely on the pairwise
comparisons embedded in this ordinal ranking. Of course, this path leads
us to Arrow's paradox, and it is not clear why we should follow such a
path. The practice chosen to resolve indecision should advance the pur-
poses of the general practice of adjudication. Selecting a practice that leads
to Arrow's paradox undermines rather than advances those purposes. In
judgment aggregation, the court seeks to identify the "correct" result,
given common criteria of correctness. The procedures embodied in DR1
and DR2 may be more reasonable ways of pursuing this goal or subsidi-
ary goals of adjudication than the use of rankings of outcomes judges be-
lieve to be wrong as the basis for selecting the "correct" answer. We
might, for example, justify DR2 by arguing that the question of whether
defendant is legally responsible is qualitatively different from and more
important than the question of appropriate remedy.
Our second example assumes multiple issues rather than multiple rem-
edies.42 Consider a criminal appeal in which the defendant urges that the
conviction be reversed on two grounds: (1) that his confession was coerced
and hence should not have been admitted at trial; and (2) that the jury
41. In this discussion, as throughout the Article, we suppress analysis of strategic voting and vote
trading on the part of the judges. One might imagine that Judge B and Judge 0 would agree on a
judgment that gave some remedy to plaintiff. They might choose a compromise remedy, or one judge
might accept the position of the other judge in exchange for a concession in another case. We think
that, while strategic voting and vote trading may well occur, they are at odds with a judgment aggre-
gation view of adjudication.
42. The second example closely parallels the first. Each ground suggests the appropriate remedy.
The two grounds thus correspond to R1 and R2 while upholding the conviction corresponds to W.
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The panel arrives at a paradoxical outcome if it decides the case by
voting on an issue-by-issue basis.43 For each issue, two judges believe the
defendant was treated fairly. But two judges believe that in this case, the
defendant was treated unfairly.44 The extent to which the case's outcome
strikes one as unfair depends on how one conceives of the process of adju-
dication. The result strikes us as unfair because both Judge A and Judge
B would, if deciding this case alone, reverse. Both judges view the trial as
defective; they simply cannot agree on a rationale, a disagreement which
we may not think sufficient to justify the defendant's incarceration.
On the other hand, agreement on the rationale for reversal may pro-
mote similar treatment of similar cases and thereby promote coherence.
To identify issues requires that we decompose our conception of fair trial
procedures into simple components. Within each component we may have
a unitary theory of decision that provides coherence to that subset of cases.
Our understanding, for example, of the evils of coerced confessions allows
us to articulate criteria for identification of them, and to relate these crite-
ria both to the evils of coerced confessions and to more general conceptions
of a fair trial. A similar understanding of jury discrimination motivates us
to isolate it as an "issue." That Judges A and B disagree on the source of
unfairness to the defendant threatens to undermine the conceptual unity
within each issue. One may then prefer issue-by-issue decisionmaking be-
cause it advances coherence.
VI. CONCLUSION
A complete theory of adjudication must account for a complex process
of decisionmaking. Theories of adjudication often begin-and end-with a
single judge, Liza, considered as though she has decided and will in the
future decide all the cases in the legal system. Complications immediately
43. Issue-by-issue voting contradicts our description of how judges decide cases. We began by
associating outcomes with fact situations and not with "issues" or subsets of fact situations.
44. Both Judges A and B might view the outcome in this case as introducing incoherence into the
legal system.
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and necessarily ensue when the theory admits a chain of judges stretching
backward and forward in time, with Liza merely one temporal link; the
difficulties increase when the theory recognizes the existence of other soli-
tary judges deciding cases concurrently with Liza. Even then, the picture
is crucially incomplete: the reality of judicial institutions demands that a
theory of adjudication account for the fact that judges sit in panels and
decide cases as groups. This last aspect of the adjudicatory enterprise gen-
erally has been ignored by theorists; in this Article we have sketched sev-
eral ways in which attention to the group aspect of judicial decisionmak-
ing both deepens and confounds a theory of adjudication.
Our analysis begins with a division of group decisionmaking into exer-
cises of judgment aggregation, preference aggregation, and representation,
and with the identification of the measures of performance-the vir-
tues-that appropriately attach to each. On our reading, judgment aggre-
gation aims at right answers (accuracy), preference aggregation at genuine
expressions of personal choice (authenticity), and representation at both
effective replication of the decisions that the represented group would
reach (fit) and a stable centrism of decisionmaking (reliability). In addi-
tion, appearance emerges as a free-floating virtue that can attach to any of
the three models of group decisionmaking.
In considering how increasing the number of judges could improve the
performance of a court, we concern ourselves primarily with adjudication
as an exercise in judgment aggregation and hence consider judicial per-
formance in terms of accuracy. We do so because we understand that
prominent, competitive views of the judicial decisionmaking pro-
cess-legalism, positivism, and legal realism-unite in demanding or at
least encouraging the judgment aggregation view of adjudication, and be-
cause we share that view. Moreover, the link between court size and accu-
racy seems particularly interesting, especially when accuracy is understood
to embrace the qualities of consistency and coherence.
Our analysis of the relationship between court size and accuracy is not
definitive, but it does indicate that adding judges improves accuracy under
plausibly optimistic assumptions about the general capacity of judges to
reach correct outcomes and about the impact of deliberation on this
capacity.
Of particular interest to our accuracy inquiry is whether groups of
judges functioning as a single court can act consistently and coherently, or
whether their group status undermines these common adjudicatory objec-
tives. We demonstrate that, if individual judges decide cases consistently,
then the court which they constitute will likewise reach consistent results.
But panels of judges, each judge of which decides cases coherently, will
not necessarily reach coherent results. To achieve coherence, a panel must
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satisfy two additional conditions: Each judge must offer a decision she
believes coherent with the prior decisions of the court (as opposed to her
own view in prior cases), and the panel must have a common conception
of coherence. The condition that the panel share a conception of coherence
is deeply problematic for theories of adjudication that seem to tolerate or
even encourage conceptual disparity among judges. Our claim in this re-
gard is an important example of the need to attend to the group aspect of
judicial decisionmaking.
In the end, we leave groups of judges where we found them, in the very
center of the appellate adjudicatory process. The only surviving mystery is
how legal theorists can contrive to overlook them.

